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I. INTRODUCTION
Reality television, celebrity, and spectacle - the media
saturation persists. The themes are embodied in celebrity and
corporate trials, which today inundate the media and proliferate
faster than reality game-shows. The Kobe Bryant sexual assault
case, the Martha Stewart stock scandal, and the Robert Blake
murder trial are just a few recent examples. As the tawdry secrets
behind glamorous facades are unveiled time and again, the public's
captivation endures.
The American public's fascination with courtroom drama is
not a new phenomenon.' From the 1935 trial of the man convicted
of kidnapping and murdering Charles Lindbergh's son to the 1994
O.J. Simpson trial, the public has been repeatedly captured by the
torrid details criminal prosecutions reveal about others' lives. The
great trial reporter Theo Wilson noted:
Real people, victims and defendants both, are
dissected at trials ... We see not only what they
want us to see, but what is normally hidden
from us, and so these trials tell us about
ourselves, our own facades and the secrets
behind them, our own potential for good and
evil, just as do the stage plays that most intrigue
3
us.
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2006.
1. See Linda Deutsch, "Trials of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 743,
743 (2000) (recounting several high profile trials, including Charles Manson
and Patty Hearst).
2. See id. at 744.
3. Id. (quoting THEO WILSON, HEADLINE JUSTICE 4 (1996)).
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The mere spectacle of courtroom drama, however, did not
always justify media coverage.4 Coverage was traditionally based
upon "hard" news - the major issues thought to be essential to an
informed and participatory citizenry. Coverage of the Sacco and
Vanzetti trials, for instance, centered on the defendants' radical
politics and immigrant status) Widespread fear of communist
infiltration in the American government was the focus of Alger
Hiss's highly publicized trial during the McCarthy Era, , and the
Pentagon Papers trial brought to light secrets of the Vietnam War.
Beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century,
however, the news industry witnessed a dramatic growth in the
volume and sources of coverage) Radio and television talk shows,
24-hour cable news stations, and the Internet gave the public a
whole new array of options! Amid frenzied efforts throughout the
news industry to maintain and attract larger audiences,
sensationalism began to supersede traditional news values. ° Stories
about sex, crime, and celebrity made headlines over articles
examining public affairs and policy. The news media - lumped
together with talking-head commentary and reality television -
4. See Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering the Audience: Television's
Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 235, 263 (1999). Few Americans have had direct experience with
the justice system and their knowledge of the criminal process is limited. As a
result, the public relies largely upon media coverage for insight into high-
profile trials. Id. at 240.
5. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839, 855-56 (Mass. 1926).
6. United States v. Hiss. 107 F. Supp. 128, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), alf'd,
201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally Deutsch, supra note 1, at 744-45
(positing that high profile trials mirror the era in which they occur).
7. See New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
8. Matt Weiser, Book Review, 41 AM. StUDIES INT'L 256 (2003)
(reviewing DARRELL M. WEST, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MEDIA
EsTABLISHMEN'T (2001)). In his book, West notes that the news was once
controlled by standard-bearers such as the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and the major television networks ABC, NBC, and CBS - but, West
says, that is no longer the case. Id.
9. See id.
10. The traditional news values include: timeliness, proximity,
prominence, and consequence. Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 289 (1999).
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became simply "the media.""
More recently, the media have begun consolidating under
the ownership of corporate titans such as Microsoft, Disney, and
Warner Bros. 12  Under this new commercial regime, corporate
interest has supplanted public interest, ethical standards have given
way to the bottom line, and what was once considered a profession
has deteriorated into what some now consider a trade - a trade
dubbed by some as "infotainment."'
Critics of this trend point to recent celebrity and corporate
trials; to the nature and extent of coverage such trials have received
by the news media.14  The accused hail from the ranks of
Hollywood's A-list and Forbes' Fortune 500; they include NBA
stars and Enron executives, industry icons and pop icons - the
11. See Eric B. Easton, Who Owns 'The First Rough )raft of History?':
Reconsidering Copyright in News, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 521, 522 (2004): see
also James McCartney, News Lite, .19 AM. JOURNALISM REV. 18, 18 (1997).
The networks have acknowledged that "competition from increasing media
rivals - cable news, Fox and now the Internet - are forcing them to find new
formulas to attract and keep viewers." Id. at 20.
12. See Weiser, supra note 8. Throughout the 1990s, the coverage of
criminal trials, such as that of O.J. Simpson, the Menendez Brothers, and Jon-
Benet Ramsey. frequently overshadowed news on political and social issues.
See RICHARD L. Fox & ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, TABLOID JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY 73 (2001). For example, an
extensive study of news segments on ABC, NBC, and CBS in 1997 revealed
eighty-six news segments on the Jon-Benet Ramsey case, compared to
nineteen segments on campaign finance reform and thirty-five segments on
health care. Id. at 76. Of the public policy topics, Medicare garnered the most
coverage, with fifty-eight segments, compared to ninety segments on the O.J.
Simpson trial. Id.
13. Cripe, supra note 4. at 240. The author criticizes "infotainment" - a
hybrid between news programs and entertainment programs - because they
are oversimplified and incomplete. Id. at 241. In the context of high profile
trial coverage, they often provide inaccurate accounts of the legal proceedings.
Id. "Infotainment" purports to stress its informative value, but the events they
cover "undergo careful editing and filtering" to achieve the necessary
entertainment element. Id. (citing David A. Harris, 7The Appearance of
Justice: Court TIV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the
Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 790 (1993)).
14. L. Lin Wood, Liigating in the Court of Public Opinion, A.B.A.
COMMITTEE NEWS: MEDIA. PRIVACY, & DEFAMATION LAW COMMITTEE,
Spring 2004 at 1, 4-5.
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"doyenne of the home-lifestyle industry" and the "King of Pop."'
'
1
Newspapers and magazines print detail after lurid detail of the sex,
crime, and scandal unveiled at the trials. Television stations boast
of "gavel to gavel" coverage, trial analysis "around the clock,"
talking-head legal experts, all news and commentary - "fair and
balanced," of course. Moreover, in light of today's increasingly
intermittent audience, courtroom coverage ad nauseant is regularly
supplemented with highlights of celebrity trials' peripheral aspects:
human interest stories featuring lawyers, witnesses, judges and,
more pertinently, jurors.3 i
As jury deliberations were underway in the highly
publicized Tyco International corporate corruption trial in March
2004, debate erupted over media coverage of jurors. The
controversy began as the public's attention in the trial turned from
Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz - both wealthy, albeit
unpopular, former Tyco executives - to "Juror No. 4," a seventy-
nine-year-old former school teacher, when it became widely
reported that "she" was holding out for acquittal.17 As the jury
deliberations were just beginning to make headway, however, The
New York Post and The Wall Street Journal broke journalistic
tradition and published the juror's name." The newspapers alleged
Ruth Jordan made a supportive hand gesture toward defendant's
counsel,', possibly to make a spectacle of herself amid the gaggle of
reporters looking for anything to report. Ms. Jordan was publicly
vilified and denigrated in chat rooms across the Internet; despite
six months of testimony and eleven days of deliberations, the judge
15. In ABC, Inc. v. Stewart. Judge Katzmann refers to Martha Stewart as
the "doyenne of the home-lifestyle industry." 360 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2004).
Michael Jackson is well known as the "King of Pop."
16. See David Shaw, The Shaping and Spinning of the Story That
Hijacked America, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at St.
17. See, e.g., Andrew R. Sorkin, Jury Is in Turmoil Over ly'co Case, N.Y.
I MES. Mar. 26, 2004, at C1 (focusing on the jury rather than the case).
18. See Carrie Johnson & Ben White, Frenzy Over Juror Won't Stop
Ivco Trial. WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2004, at El.
19. Brooke A. Masters, Tyco Case Raises [ssue of Jurors' Anonymity,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2004, at El [hereinafter Tyco Case].
20. See Anthony Lin, Lawyers Fear Resistance to Serving on Juries.,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 2004, at 6.
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was forced to declare a mistrial."
Amid the fallout, a trend has emerged among lower courts
to impose heightened restrictions on public access to juror identities
in high-profile trials. A New York federal court judge, for example,
ordered the media not to reveal the names of any prospective or
sitting jurors in the retrial of a former Credit Suisse First Boston
investment banker, Frank Quattrone.2 Additionally, in California's
highly-publicized prosecution of Scott Peterson, the trial judge
denied the media's request for copies of completed juror
questionnaires because he perceived that the "unique" level of
"aggressive and ongoing media scrutiny" would lead to "a violation
of the jurors' right to privacy."3 In sum, courts from New York to
California are turning the First Amendment on its head and
imposing greater restrictions on public access in cases where public
interest is at its greatest. The United States Supreme Court has not
yet decided the constitutionality of such restrictions. The Court,
however, has acknowledged and gradually expanded the public's
First Amendment right of access to various judicial proceedings -
Part II examines those decisions. After a brief survey of the
decisions by lower courts that have addressed whether a First
Amendment right of access attaches to jurors' identity, Part III
posits that the First Amendment right of access should extend to
jurors' identities. Part IV concludes that, in spite of the motives
behind the media's desire to obtain access to jurors' identity, the
interests which led the Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional
right to other aspects of a criminal trial would equally be served by
recognition of a right of access to jurors' identities.
21. Masters, supra note 19, at El.
22. Andrew R. Sorkin, Judge in Banker Case Upholds Ban on Naminig of
Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2004, at C4.
23. Erica L. Craven, Star Power Trumping Access, A.B.A. COMMITTEE
NEWS: MEDIA, PRIVACY. & DEFAMATION LAW COMMITTEE, Spring 2004, at 7.,
8.
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11. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: RECOGNITION AND
EXPANSION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The right of Due Process of Law, guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
recognizes that "no power [exists] in either the State or the national
Government to deprive any person of... life, liberty, and property,
except by due process of law; that is, by an impartial trial according
to the laws of the land." 4 Until fairly recently, the Supreme Court
had never directly acknowledged a First Amendment right of theS 25
press or public to attend the criminal trial. However, it had long
held that the Due Process Clause embodied the criminally
accused's Sixth Amendment right to "a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury."-6 Accordingly, the Court suggested that the
press should be barred from attending a criminal trial where its
presence threatened the accused's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
In the celebrated case of Sheppard v. Maxwell,' a well-
known Cleveland physician, Dr. Sam Sheppard, was charged and
convicted for the gruesome murder of his wife.2' The publicity
surrounding Sheppard's trial, at the time, was without comparison."
24. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.. 1st Sess. App. 153 (1871).
25. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(acknowledging for the first time that the press and public enjoy a First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings).
26. U.S. CONST. amend VI. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
223 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial into the
Due Process Clause); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961)
(incorporating the right to an impartial jury), In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-73
(1948) (incorporating the right to a public trial and notice).
27. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
28. Sheppard's conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.
State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956). cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910
(1956). Eight years later, on a writ of habeas corpus, a federal district court
found Sheppard was denied due process. Sheppard v. Maxwell. 231 F. Supp.
37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd by 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd by 384 U.S.
333 (1966).
29. The Court noted:
'Typical of the coverage during this period is a front-
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The Ohio Supreme Court noted:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense
were combined in this case in such a manner as
to intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a
degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals.
Throughout the preindictment investigation,
the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-
week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered
to the insatiable interest of the American
public in the bizarre.... In this atmosphere of a
"Roman holiday" for the news media, Sam
Sheppard stood trial for his life.
In 1965 the United States Supreme Court overturned the
jury's verdict and ordered a new trial.1 The Court found that
page interview entitled: "DR. SAM: 'I Wish There
Was Something I Could Get Off My Chest - but There
Isn't.'" Unfavorable publicity included items such as a
cartoon of the body of a sphinx with Sheppard's head
and the legend below: "'I Will Do Everything In My
Power to Help Solve This Terrible Murder.' - Dr. Sam
Sheppard." Headlines announced, inter alia. that:
"Doctor Evidence is Ready for Jury," "Corrigan
Tactics Stall Quizzing," "Sheppard 'Gay Set' Is
Revealed by Houk," "Blood Is Found In Garage,"
"New Murder Evidence Is Found, Police Claim." "Dr.
Sam Faces Quiz At Jail On Marilyn's Fear Of Him."
On August 18, an article appeared under the headline
"Dr. Sam Writes His Own Story." And reproduced
across the entire front page was a portion of the typed
statement signed by Sheppard: "I am not guilty of the
murder of my wife, Marilyn. How could I, who have
been trained to help people and devoted my life to
saving life, commit such a terrible and revolting
crime?"
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 341-42.
30. Jd. at 356 (quoting State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio
1956)).
31. Judge Robertson noted the significance of the Sheppard decision in
the context of the 1960s, when the Supreme Court rendered a host of decisions
implicating aspects of the trial and police tactics. James Robertson. A Distant
Mirror: The Sheppard Case From the Next Millennium. 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
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"bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen
took over practically the entire courtroom,"' , and that "the jurors
were thrust into the role of celebrities. . ."' Holding that "the state
trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the
inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and
to control disruptive influences in the courtroom, ' ' the Court
stated, "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial ... [t]he courts must take such
steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences." Thus, Sheppard effectively
391, 394 (2001): see Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363. For example, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was decided in the same year as the Sheppard
case. Other cases from that decade include Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(evidence obstained through unconstitutional search inadmissible in criminal
trial), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of indigent defendant
to appointed counsel), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(requirement that prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence).
32. Sheppard. 384 U.S. at 355.
33. Id. at 353.
[T]he jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by
the judge's failure to insulate them from reporters and
photographers. The numerous pictures of the jurors,
with their addresses, which appeared in the
newspapers before and during the trial itself exposed
them to expressions of opinion from both cranks and
friends. The fact that anonymous letters had been
received by prospective jurors should have made the
judge aware that this publicity seriously threatened the
jurors' privacy.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 363.
35. Id. The Court prescribed eleven steps a court could take to
ameliorate the deleterious effects of excessive publicity and guarantee a fair
trial by an impartial jury: (1) The number of journalists admitted to the court
should be limited; (2) The behavior of journalists in court should be regulated:
(3) Witnesses should be insulated from extrajudicial information: (4) The
judge should control the release of information to the press by police officers,
witnesses, and counsel for both sides: (5) The judge should warn reporters to
check the accuracy of their news stories; (6) The court should point out the
impropriety of publishing material not introduced in the proceedings: (7) The
judge should request that appropriate city and county officials issue
regulations governing the dissemination of information about the case by their
imposed an affirmative duty on trial judges to restrict media access
where the possibility of prejudicial media coverage exists.
The Court first addressed whether the media has a right to
insist upon access to judicial proceedings in Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale."' Affirming a trial court's order excluding the press
and public from a pre-trial suppression hearing, the Court in
DePasquale stated that the right to a public trial is "personal to the
accused."' Hence, the Court held that "members of the public
have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to attend criminal trials."" Although the Court did
not explicitly decide whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments confer a right to the press and public to attend
criminal trials, the Court in dicta stated that "the actions of the trial
judge here were consistent with any right of access the petitioner
may have had under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.""
Less than one year after DePasquale, however, the Court in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia reversed its position and
expressly recognized a First Amendment right of the press and
public to observe criminal proceedings, as made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 1 Chief Justice Burger,
employees; (8) When necessary, a case should be continued until the threat of
prejudicial pretrial publicity abates: (9) The trial should be moved to another
county where the publicity level is acceptable; (10) 'The jury should be
sequestered where the inflow of information is excessive and prejudicial;
and/or (11) If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the
trial, a new trial should be ordered. Id. at 358-63.
36. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
37. Jd. at 380 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806. 848 (1975)). The
Court stated that the Sixth Amendment affords only the defendant, and not
the public in general, a right to a public trial. Id. at 381. If the defendant
wishes to waive that right, he may do so, though the Sixth Amendment "does
not guarantee the right to compel a private trial." Id. at 382.
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id. at 392. "First, none of the spectators present in the courtroom,
including the reporter employed by the petitioner, objected when the
defendants made the closure motion." Id. "Furthermore, any denial of access
in this case was not absolute but only temporary." [d. at 393.
40. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (acknowledging a public First Amendment right of access
to criminal trials).
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writing for the plurality, opened the door to the media's right of
access as he announced for the first time that "the right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment., 4 ' He noted: "What is significant for present
purposes is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to
all who cared to observe."4  Furthermore, "[the] expressly
guaranteed freedoms [of the First Amendment] share a common
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government., 41 Supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, the Chief Justice stated, "a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
trial under our system of justice. 4 4 He further concluded, "[a]bsent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public."_
45
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise
I"), the Supreme Court extended the public's right of access to voir
46
dire jury selection hearings in criminal trials. The Court,
41. ld. (footnote omitted). The defendant was tried for murder four
times over a two-year period. At the fourth trial, the judge ordered the trial
closed after finding that "having people in the Courtroom is distracting to the
jury." Id. at 561. On appeal, the plurality framed the question as follows:
"[W]hether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the
unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is
required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some
other overriding consideration requires closure." Id. at 564.
42. [d.
43. [d. at 575. The Court specifically identified the following purposes
served by openness of criminal proceedings: (1) ensuring that proceedings are
conducted fairly: (2) discouraging perjury, misconduct or participants, and
biased decisions; (3) providing a controlled outlet for community hostility and
emotion; (4) securing public confidence in the results of a trial through the
appearance of fairness and (5) inspiring confidence in judicial proceedings
through education on the methods of government and judicial remedies. Id. at
569-72.
44. Id. at 573.
45. Id. at 581. Where an overriding interest is articulated in findings,
Chief Justice Burger noted that a trial judge may "in the interest of the fair
administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial."
Id. at 581 n.18.
46. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 513
(1984) (contemplating whether the voir dire of potential jurors was more like
[Vol. 3
moreover, announced a heightened standard upon which the right
of access may be denied. Chief Justice Burger, once again writing
for the Court, stated that "the presumption of openness may be
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest."4" That interest, he concluded, must
be "articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was properly
entered. ,4
a trial subject to the open public proceedings rule of Richmond Newspapers,
or more like a pretrial matter subject to Gannett: and ruling that total closure
of voir dire was not warranted) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 1].
47. [d. at 510. Cf. Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 581 ("Absent an
overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be
open to the public."). The Court in Press-Enterprise I stated:
When limited closure is ordered, the constitutional
values sought to be protected by holding open
proceedings may be satisfied later by making a
transcript of the closed proceedings available within a
reasonable time, if the judge determines that disclosure
can be accomplished while safeguarding the juror's
valid privacy interests. Even then a valid privacy right
may rise to a level that part of the transcript should be
sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect the
person from embarrassment.
Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 512 (emphasis added).
As one scholar has noted, "[t]his passage has been read to imply that
jurors' identities are part and parcel of voir dire, and as such are governed by
the same principles of presumptive access." David Weinstein, Protecting a
Juror's Right to Privac': Constitutional Constraints and Policy Opinions, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 30 (1997). See also State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v.
Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180. 192 (Ohio 2002) (reading Press-ELnterprise I "to
explicitly include juror identity as part of the voir dire proceedings that should
be analyzed under the First Amendment").
48. Press Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510. Here, the Court found the closure
order invalid:
The judge at this trial closed an incredible six weeks of
voir dire without considering alternatives to closures.
Later the Court declined to release a transcript of the
voir dire even while stating that "most of the
information" in the transcript was "dull and
boring."... [The judge failed] to articulate findings
2005] JUROR IDENTITIES
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In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California
(Press-Enterprise II), the Court extended the First Amendment
right of access to pre-trial hearings.4) Furthermore, the Court
expressly adopted the two-prong guidepost of "experience" and
"logic" to determine whether a First Amendment right of access
exists, i.e., (1) "whether the place and process have historically been
open to the press and general public,",50 and (2) "whether public
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question." ' Where "experience" and "logic"
dictate the existence of a First Amendment right of access, the
Court held that a preliminary criminal hearing may be closed "only
if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a
substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will
be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second,
reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the
defendant's fair trial rights.",52 In so holding, the heightened
with the requisite specificity ... [and] to consider
alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the
transcript.
Id. at 513.
49. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise 11].
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 14. In so holding, the Court effectively clarified the "overriding
interest" standards established in Press-Enterprise I by explicitly setting forth
what "overriding interest" would justify closure. In other words, the new
"substantial probability of prejudice" defined the "overriding interest"
standard established in Press-Enterprise . Id. at 13-14. In applying the rules
to the facts of the case, the Court recognized that potential for prejudice
existed, but that other remedies should have been attempted before closing
the proceeding altogether. The Court stated:
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify
refusing public access to hearings on every motion to
suppress. Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in
some circumstances, a court can identify those jurors
whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them
from rendering an impartial verdict. And even if
closure were justified for the hearings on a motion to
suppress, closure of an entire 41-day proceeding would
rarely be warranted. The First Amendment right of
[Vol. 3
"substantial probability of prejudice" standard clarified the
"overriding interest" standard, which justified closure under Press-
Enterprise 15
Ill. THE DIVIDE AMONG LOWER COURTS: APPLICATION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUROR IDENTITIES
The public's right of access to courtroom proceedings was
tested in early 2004 amid the high-profile criminal prosecutions of
Martha Stewart and of her former stockbroker, Peter Bacanovic.
From the beginning, the case attracted widespread national media
attention.", Recognizing the problems presented in impaneling an
unbiased jury, U.S. District Court Judge Miriam Goldman
Cederbaum entered an order in January mandating that "no
member of the press [could] be present for any voir dire
proceedings [to be] conducted in the robing room"; instead, the
order provided "a transcript of each day's voir dire proceedings
access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion
that publicity might deprive the defendant of that right.
And any limitation "must be narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."
Id. at 15.
53. See Marc 0. Litt, Citizen Soldiers or A noninouts Justice: Reconciling
the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of" the
Media, and the Privacy Right of JIurors. 25 CoLtM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 371, 388
(1992).
54. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart. 360 F.3d 90. 96 (2d Cir. 2004). The criminal
charges against Stewart stemmed from her sale of 3,928 shares of stock in the
biotech company, ImClone Systems, Inc., on December 27. 2001 - just before
the Food and Drug Administration announced its rejection of ImClone's
application for approval of its highly touted cancer-fighting drug. Id. at 93.
After ImClone's stock price plummeted, the government initiated an
investigation into whether Stewart's sale of stock was "in violation of federal
securities laws and regulations that prohibit trading on the basis of material.,
nonpublic information." Id. Specifically, Stewart was accused of conspiracy
to commit offenses against the United States, making false statements.,
obstruction of agency proceedings, and securities fraud. Peter Bacanovic, on
the other hand, was charged with conspiracy to commit offenses against the
United States, making false statements and documents, perjury, and
obstruction of agency proceedings. Id. at 94.
55. Id.
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[would] be made public the following day, with the names of
prospective or selected jurors redacted from the transcripts, as well
as such deeply personal information as any juror [should]
reasonably request not be made public." '  Seventeen news
organizations objected and, at an in-court hearing, argued that the
order infringed upon their First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings. Judge Cederbaum, however, declined to
vacate or significantly modify the order, observing:
We have had a remarkable amount of
extraordinary press effort to treat many aspects
of the case which have nothing to do with the
trial of the case or the merits of the case or
what will the evidence be because there seems
to be - and I do not say this critically - an
extraordinary interest quite beyond the public's
right to know.
On appeal, the Second Circuit in ABC, Inc. v. Stewart held
that the closure order was both unwarranted and unjustified.'
"[O]ne cannot transcribe an anguished look or a nervous tic,"
Judge Katzmann wrote for the appellate court. ' "The ability to see
and to hear a proceeding as [it] unfolds is a vital component of the
First Amendment right of access - not ... an incremental benefit.',6
"The burden is heavy on those who seek to restrict access to the
56. Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Stewart. No. 3 Cr. 717, 2004 WL
651592 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2004)).
57. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 96. Specifically, the media argued the
following aspects of the order were:
[U]nconstitutional abridgments of the First
Amendment: (1) its closure of the voir dire
proceedings scheduled to be administered in the robing
room; (2) its provision for juror anonymity; and (3) its
imposition of a prior restraint on the publication of




59. Id. at 106.
60. [d. at 99.
61. Id.
media, a vital means to open justice," Judge Katzmann declared'
"Here, the government has failed to overcome the presumption of
openness. The mere fact of intense media coverage of a celebrity
defendant, without further compelling justification, is simply not
enough to justify closure.""'
To the extent that any candor concerns may have been
implicated by certain voir dire lines of questioning, Judge
Katzmann stated, "[W]e do not see why simply concealing the
identities of the prospective jurors would not have been sufficient
to ensure juror candor.""4 Nevertheless, he stated, "we fail to see
why the media had to be barred from the entirety of the voir dire
examinations. " For these reasons, the appellate court vacated the
portion of district court's order which "barred the media from
attending the voir dire proceedings held in the district judge's
robing room. ,6 The Second Circuit's decision, however,
unmistakably suggested that neither the press nor public possesses
a First Amendment right to names of jurors)
Other lower courts have explicitly decided whether the First
Amendment confers upon the public a right of access to jurors'
identities. Some courts have found that juror identities are
fundamentally related to the criminal process and, thus, have
recognized a right of access." Conversely, other courts have
62. Id. at 106.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 104.
65. Jd. at 105.
66. Id. at 106.
67. Jd. at 104-05.
68. People v. Mitchell (In re Juror Names), 592 N.W.2d 798, 809 (Mich.
App. 1999) (holding newspaper had qualified First Amendment right of access
post verdict to names and addresses of jurors, subject to trial court's discretion
to fashion order taking into account juror safety and other interests, and
remanding for specific findings as to juror safety); State ex rel. Beacon Journal
Publ'g Co. v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180, 192-94 (Ohio 2002) (applying the
"experience and logic" tests espoused in the Press-Enterprise line of cases and
finding that a right of access attaches to jury list)- see also In re Globe
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1990); In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d
74 (4th Cir. 1988), Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 839 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mass.
1993); in re Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ind. 1992);
United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987), aff'd in part and
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concluded that a juror's identity is merely collateral information,
distinct from any judicial proceeding to which the right of access
would otherwise attach.") Thus, the divide among the courts
concerns the threshold issue of whether a trial court's denial of
access to juror identities is a process that triggers First Amendment
analysis. 1
The Delaware Supreme Court was perhaps the first court,
post-Richmond Newspapers, to explicitly consider whether a First
Amendment right of access attaches to juror identity.7 1 In Gannett
Co., Inc. v. State, a trial judge had entered an order mandating that
jury selection be decided by numbers - not by names - in the
highly-publicized case of a serial killer and three female victims.7
Autopsy photos revealed that each victim had been "bound and
tortured, their bodies mutilated."'  The lurid details indeed
attracted massive pretrial publicity, and the trial judge refused to
rev'd in part, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989). Sullivan, Indianapolis Newspapers,
and Doherty imposed a brief moratorium (seven-to-ten days after the verdict)
before releasing the jurors' names. At least one court has criticized such an
approach for failing to adequately address threats on juror safety. See In re
Juror Names, 592 N.W.2d at 806.
69. See,. e.g., United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987)
(ruling that trial judge's refusal to release names and addresses of jurors did
not violate the First Amendment right of access); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State,
571 A.2d 735, 750-51 (Del. 1989) (suggesting that inherent conflicts between
the First and Sixth Amendments are to be resolved on a case-by-case basis by
the trial judge) [hereinafter Gannett Co.]; Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d
930. 933 n.4 (N.Y. 1987) (distinguishing between voir dire attendance and
juror information).
70. See Beacon Journal. 781 N.E.2d at 192 (stating that "the divide
among courts concerns the threshold issue of whether juror names and
addresses are the type of judicial records that trigger First Amendment
analysis").
71. Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 735. C[ In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920
F.2d 88, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1990) (determining that the media enjoy a common law
right of access to juror information, but declining to base its decision on the
First Amendment); In re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988)
(finding a common law right of access to juror information).
72. Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 737.
73. [d.
74. Jd. The trial court compiled a list of thirty-five articles published in
The [Delaware! New-Journal, alone, in the three months leading up to the
pretrial suppression hearing. Id. at 737 n.2.
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grant Gannett's motion to vacate the order.
On appeal, Gannett argued that the order violated its
qualified First Amendment right of access to the jurors' names.6
But the Delaware Supreme Court, applying the Press-Enterprise H
threshold test for closure, found no consistent, widespread tradition
of public access to juror identities . The court, moreover, found
that disclosure of juror identities at trial "promotes neither the
fairness nor the perception of fairness, when... all proceedings are
open to the public." 1, Because Gannett failed to show otherwise,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that "the trial court's decision to
order court personnel to keep jurors' names confidential was within
its discretion.'
Farther south, in Louisiana, when racketeering charges
were levied against former governor Edwin Edwards and fellow
political baron James Harvey "Jim" Brown, the accompanying
publicity took the state by storm, and in 2000, the federal district
court ordered all prospective juror names redacted from the
records."' The media objected and appealed the district court's
post-verdict order sealing the jurors' identities; nonetheless, the
Fifth Circuit considered the pre-trial empanelment of an
anonymous jury."
At the outset, the court noted that "[e]ager media have
entertained the citizens of Louisiana and beyond with nonstop
coverage of the current prosecutions of Louisiana's colorful ex-
Governor." ' 2 The court found that the district court had gone to
"extraordinary lengths to preserve the integrity of the jury
75. Id. at 738. In a written opinion, the trial judge stated that the media
had no right to require a trial judge to release jurors' identities under the
Delaware Freedom of information Act, which exempted nonpublic records
from disclosure. Id. at 738-39.
76. Id. at 739.
77. Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 744-48.
78. Id. at 751.
79. Id.
80. S.L. Alexander, Trials of the Century: U.S. v. Edwin Edwards 2000, 48
LA. BAR J. 290, 294 (2000).
81. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001).
82. [d. at 912.
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system... in the face of relentless publicity," and detailed the
"abundant" evidence which supported that court's "fears of an
imminent and serious threat" to the jury members from both the
14
defendants and the press . The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
anonymous jury was in fact needed to prevent the jurors from
becoming "unwilling pawns in the frenzied media battle."' While
acknowledging that juror names were usually within the public
domain, the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court's order
redacting the jurors' names effectively placed the information
within the private area; thus, the restrictions on such non-public,
merely collateral information were appropriate.
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit recognized a right of access
to the names and addresses of jurors in In re The Baltimore Sun.
Applying the principles set forth in Press-Enterprise I and Press-
Enterprise II, the court examined the history of access and found
that "[w]hen the jury system grew up... everybody knew
everybody on the jury."" The court took judicial notice that "this is
yet so in many rural communities throughout the country [today]."'
While acknowledging that its decision might present added
difficulties for trial judges in the context of high-profile cases, the
court concluded:
[T]he risk of loss of confidence of the public in
the judicial process is too great to permit a
criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose
members may maintain anonymity. If the
district court thinks that the attendant dangers
of a highly publicized trial are too great, it may
always sequester the jury- and change of venue
is always a possible as a method of obviating
83. Id.
84. Id. at 916 (observing Edward's prior conviction for interference with
the judicial process, the prior guilty pleas to witness tampering by two
defendants, and the media's prior pursuit of jurors despite the anonymity
order).
85. Id. at 921.
86. Id. at 914-15.




pressure or prejudice." '
Perhaps the most recent case addressing whether a right of
access extends to jurors' identities was decided by the Ohio
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Company
v. Bond." In 2002, that court held that the First Amendment right
of access extends to jury questionnaires, juror names, and juror
addresses." The case arose as the Akron Beacon Journal sought
access to jury lists amid the highly-publicized "murder-during-rape"
and "murder-during-kidnapping" trial of Dennis Ross. The trial
judge, however, denied the newspaper's request, stating that "the
extraordinary level of pretrial publicity requires the protection of
the privacy of the jurors and is necessary to assure [sic] the
independence and integrity of the jury and to avoid complete
sequestration during the trial.",13 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court applied the threshold test of "experience and logic" to
determine the constitutionality of the order. After finding a
historical tradition of access to jurors' identities 4 the court noted
that public access to juror identities protects against such
improprieties as having juries loaded with a narrow class of people
and misrepresentation by jurors during voir dire examinations."'
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that public access serves "to
enhance the operation of the jury system itself by educating the
public as to their own duties and obligations should they be called
for jury service.",6 Thus, it determined that both "experience" and
"logic" required disclosure.
IV. THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
JUROR'S IDENTITIES IN HIGH PROFILE TRIALS
In Press-Enterprise H, the Supreme Court set forth a two-
90. Id. at 76.
91. 781 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 2002).
92. Id. at 194.
93. Id. at 185.
94. Id. at 192-93.
95. Id. at 193-94.
96. Id. at 194 (quoting United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 723
(D. Mass. 1987)).
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part test to determine whether and when First Amendment right of
access existsi First, it must be determined whether the proceeding
or practice in question has been traditionally accessible to the
public." Secondly, the purposes served by public access must play a
significant role in enhancing the judicial process. Where these two
questions are answered in the affirmative, a presumptive First
Amendment right of access attaches that may be overcome only
where "specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is
a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will
be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second,
reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the
defendant's fair trial rights."'")
A. The Test of "Experience"
Dating back to 16th century English common law, the
selection of jurors has been a public process. From the beginning,
jurors were selected from a pool of landowners living de vicineto,
i.e., in the immediate vicinity, where the dispute arose.0 This
"vicinage requirement" necessarily limited the pool of prospective
jurors to persons familiar with the facts of the dispute and to those
who could verify the credibility of the witnesses and accused.
Jurors' identities, therefore, were known to everyone.""
As principles of our modern-day jury crystallized, the role
97. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. The rationale for the
two-part test was first articulated in Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555. 589 (1980) (Brennan. J..
concurring): thus, courts generally refer to it as the Richmond Newspapers
test. See, e.g., North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft. 308 F.3d 198. 209
(3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002).
98. Beacon Journal, 781 N.E.2d at 194.
99. Id.
100. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
101. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1984).
102. Jack Pope, The Jury. 39 TEX. L. REv. 426, 437 (1961) ("When the
jury system grew up with juries of the vicinage, everybody knew everybody on
the jury .. "); see also In re Baltimore Sun. 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988);
Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 755 (Del. 1989) (Walsh, J., dissenting).
103. Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 75.
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of jurors evolved from witnesses of fact to impartial judges of 
fact. 14
Thus, courts sought to exclude persons familiar with the facts and
parties of the dispute, but jurors continued to be drawn exclusively
from the locality in which the dispute arose. The functional role of
the jury - as a representative body of the community that "stood for
the judgment of the people" - endured. 115 In practice, therefore,
prospective jurors were randomly selected from slips of paper on
which their names were written,"' and as their identities were
announced before the community in open court, each could be
challenged for personal knowledge of the events in dispute.
The English common law practices carried into colonial
America and were largely followed when the Constitution was
adopted in 1789." In 1670, the names of jurors were publicly
announced at William Penn's trial for inciting unlawful assembly.""
Jurors' identities were also made public at John Peter Zenger's trial
in 1735."" And despite express opposition to the same in Aaron
Burr's famous conspiracy trial, "the names of jurors were called"
and questioned extensively before "[a]n immense concourse of
citizens."'
104. Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 755-56 (Walsh, J., dissenting).
105. Pope, supra note 102, at 437. See also Steven A. Engel, The Public's
Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1675
(2000).
106. Pope, supra note 102, at 444.
107. See Engle, supra note 105, at 1675.
108. Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 75.
109. See Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 756 n.3 (Walsh, J., dissenting) ("The
court... commanded that every juror should distinctly answer to his name.
and give in his separate verdict, which they unanimously did, saying, Not guilty
'to the great satisfaction of the assembly."') (citations omitted).
110. See id.
111. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 74 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,693). See also Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 757 (Walsh, J., dissenting). "At the
instance of Mr. Hay [the prosecuting attorney] the names of the jurors were
called, when forty-six answered to their names, two only being absent." Id.
(quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74). The prospective jurors were then called one-
by-one and questioned extensively on their opinions and the role that the
newspapers had played in shaping them. Id. When only four satisfactory
jurors could be drawn from the first venire, a second group of potential jurors
was summoned and "called, and all except seven answered to their names."
Id. (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 85). Finally, after a voir dire lasting several
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Only in recent history have jurors become relative strangers
to the public. As the Fourth Circuit in In re Baltimore Sun noted,
"the anonymity of life in the cities has so changed the complexion
of this country that even the press, with its vast and imaginative
methods of obtaining information, apparently does not know and
cannot easily obtain the names of [unidentified] jurors."' But this
vanishing social reality should not be mistaken for a new-fangled
phenomenon; an emerging trend does not constitute a historical
tradition. To the contrary, the considerable body of evidence
available suggests otherwise - jurors' identities were presumptively
public both under English and American law. Even today, jurors'
identities remain public in many jurisdictions. "3
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court - prior to its acknowledgment of the First
Amendment right of access - recognized a historically based
common law right to inspect and copy judicial records and
documents. Jurors' names traditionally have been just as much a
part of the public record as any other documented fact in a given
case. Statutes providing otherwise, therefore, may contravene
such common law right."
A number of federal and state statutes, of course, have been
enacted to afford judges discretion to seal juror names."7
days, twelve satisfactory jurors were chosen and sworn. Id. The names of the
selected jurors and of the venire were then called over. ld. After which, John
M. Sheppard, and Richard Curd were selected to complete the panel, and
sworn. The following is, therefore, a complete list of the petit jury: [twelve
names]. Id. (citing Burr. 25 F. Cas. at 87).
112. Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 75.
113. See Gannett Co., 571 A.3d at 757 (Walsh. J.. dissenting).
11.4. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589. 597 (1978).
Many state and federal courts have extended the First Amendment right of
access to the same.
115. See, e.g., State, ex rel. N.M. Press v. Kaufman, 648 P.2d 300, 306
(N.M. 1982) ("[IT]he names of the jurors were announced in open court and
filed as a public record .... ).
116. See infra notes 118-20.
117. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2000) (noting that federal judges
may keep juror names confidential in any case where the interest of justice so
requires); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1904(a)(3) (2001) (providing that a plan for
jury selection shall include provisions for disclosure of juror names except in
[Vol. 3
2005] JUROR IDENTITIES
Nevertheless, far more statutes continue to reflect the historical
tradition of openness. In several states, statutes expressly provide
that jurors shall be named in open court during voir dire.' In other
states, the law sets forth a presumption of public accessibility to
master jury lists. Still others have created a presumption that the
names of qualified or selected jurors will be called at voir dire. j
Whatever the case, the United States Supreme Court does
not require proof that restrictions never have been - or never could
cases in which the chief judge determines that confidentiality is required);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4513(a) (1999) (providing that courts have
discretion to keep the names and questionnaires of jurors confidential): 2004
Ind. Adv. Legis. Serv. P.L. 98-2004 ch. 5, § 19(e) (Michie) ("The names of
qualified jurors drawn from the qualified jury wheel and the contents of jury
qualification forms completed by those jurors may not be made available to
the public until the period of service of those jurors has expired. However,
attorneys in any cases in which these jurors may serve may have access to the
information."); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 814 (2003) (granting the judge discretion
to withhold the names and addresses of jurors); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-
A:5(I) (2004 & Supp. 2004) (exempting jury records from the "right-to-know"
law): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 853.1 (West 1995) (providing that the court
upon good cause may withhold "the identity and the business or residential
address of any prospective or sworn juror to any person.. . other than to
counsel for either party").
118. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-74 (1975): ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-
325 (West 2002); MONt. CODE ANN. § 3-15-507 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-
5-13 (Michie 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 594 (West 1971): 42 PA. CONS.
STAr. ANN. § 4524 (West 2004): TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-2-306 (1994).
119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-57(C) (.1975): IDAHO CODE § 2-206(3)
(Michie 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-5.5-7(3) (Michie 1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 9 (West 2000): Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.4 10 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2005): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-5 (West Supp. 2004): N.C. GEN. STAT. §
9-4 (2003): N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-05(3) (1991): 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4521 (b) (West 2004): UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-10(4) (2002): W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-1-5(d) (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.04(9) (West 2001).
120. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-312 (West 2002); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4513 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-15(a) (1993); IDAHO CODE
§ 2-210(2) (Michie 2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.060 (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.070 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 1254-A(7) (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & J UD. PROC. §
8-202(3) (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 18 (West 2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-5-32 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-503 (2003); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2B:20-4 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-11(A) (Michie
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09 (1991): W. VA. CODE § 52-1-9 (2004).
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have been - imposed. In Press-Enterp rise I, for instance, the Court
acknowledged that more than a few states had enacted statutes and
regulations allowing preliminary hearings to be closed. The
decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court addressed similar statutes. I' Just as those laws
failed to overcome the historical tradition of openness, the
provisions today affording judges discretion to seal juror identities,
likewise, fail to overcome the nation's rich history and enduring
tradition of public access to juror identities.
B. The Test of "Logic"
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court declared that
the guarantees of the First Amendment "share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating
to the function of government."" - Over a century earlier, Alexis de
Tocqueville recognized that the American jury was "pre-eminently
a political institution."" In 1789 Thomas Jefferson famously said
that it would be better to leave the people out of the legislative
branch than the judicial one, for the "execution of the laws is more
important than [even] the making [of] them. ',1 21 Where the jury -or
any other political institution - is cloaked in a veil of anonymity,
public discourse on matters critically germane to the criminal
121. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 UJ.S. 555 (1980); In re
Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d 88. 96 (1st Cir. 1990) (observing that even though
the interest of protecting minor sex crime victims from additional trauma is a
compelling one, the statute was unconstitutional because it did not provide for
the constitutionally required case-by-case review and findings necessary to
justify closure).
122. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1986): see also Gannett Co. v.
State, 571 A.2d 735. 757-58 (Del. 1989) (Walsh, J., dissenting).
123. Richmond Neivspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
124. ALEXIS DE TOCOUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283 (Phillips
Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1946) (1835). De Tocqueville continued,
"The jury is that portion of the nation to which the execution of the laws is
entrusted, as the legislature is that part of the nation which makes the laws."
Id.
125. THOMAS JEFFERSON. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 15, 283
(Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Jniversity Press, 1958) (containing a letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789)).
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process and, indeed, our government as a whole, is frustrated.
' 
6
In determining whether the press and public enjoy a First
Amendment right of access, the United States Supreme Court has
identified the following purposes served by openness in criminal
proceedings: (1) assuring that proceedings are conducted fairly; (2)
discouraging perjury, misconduct of participants, and biased
decisions; (3) prophylaxis as an outlet for community hostility and
emotion; (4) ensuring public confidence in a trial's results through
the appearance of fairness; and (5) inspiring confidence in judicial
proceedings through education regarding the methods of
government and judicial remedies.
127
For many of the same reasons, public access to juror
identities enhances the criminal process. As the Supreme Court
observed, "[k]nowledge of juror identities allows the public to
verify the impartiality of key participants in the administration of
justice, and thereby ensures fairness, the appearance of fairness and
public confidence in that system."' '
Public access supports our long-standing tradition of
selecting disinterested jurors from a representative pool of the
community. Indeed, this tradition assures the accused will be
judged by the standards of society rather than the biases of distinct3 '9
groups. As Justice Walsh said in his Gannett Co. dissent:
If groups such as women or racial minorities
are excluded from service, "[s]uch action is
operative to destroy the basic democracy and
classlessness of jury personnel." The injury is
not limited to the defendant - there is injury to
the jury system, to the law as an institution, to
the community at large, and to the democratic
126. See Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 762 (Walsh, J., dissenting) ("If jurors
are cloaked in anonymity, the bond between the jury and the public is
weakened.")
127. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1984); Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-72; In re Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st
Cir. 1990); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180,
193 (Ohio 2002).
128. Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 94.
129. Gannett Co., 571 A.2d at 761 (Walsh, J., dissenting).
2005] JUROR IDENTITIES
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
ideal reflected in the processes of the courts.""
Moreover, public access to juror identities permits the
discovery of juror bias, and it discourages untruthful voir dire
testimony.' Where jurors' identities are concealed, on the other
hand, the public is unable to challenge either the impartiality of
jurors or the accuracy of prospective jurors' voir dire testimony.
The adverse consequences of this became apparent in the high-
profile trial of Martha Stewart. Following the Second Circuit's
ruling in ABC, Inc. v. Martha Stewart, Judge Cederbaum chose to
withhold the names of jurors until after a verdict was reached. 2
Oddly enough, Stewart later moved for a new trial, claiming that a
prejudicial, publicity-hungry juror lied about his checkered past to
get on the jury and evinced his bias upon taking the airwaves after
trial to proclaim that Stewart's conviction was a "victory for the
little guy."'  The court ultimately denied Stewart's motion;
nonetheless, it raised questions as to the fairness of her trial.' Had
the media and public otherwise been granted access to the jurors'
identities, the whole controversy might have been avoided.
In the same way, one may speculate as to the public
backlash Judge Obus might have faced in the event that he had not
declared a mistrial - or, perhaps alternatively, in the event that The
Wall Street Journal and The New York Post had not published the
identity of "Juror No. 4.'t 5 Whatever the case, the Supreme Court
has made clear: "People in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing." '  While
anonymous juries create an appearance of injustice, erode public
confidence in the system, and contravene the historical precedent of
openness, public access to jurors' identities serves to reassure
130. Id. (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946))
(citations omitted).
131. Beacon Journal, 781 N.E.2d at 194.
132. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
133. Ben White, Juror Chappell Hartridge, Man of the Martha Moment,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at Dl.
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Americans that, through our criminal process, justice is rendered.
V. CONCLUSION
United States appellate court judge Learned Hand
observed, "[t]he hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and
the far-spread magazine, rules the country; whether we like it or
not, we must learn to accept it.'"-
Amid the advancing technology and the shifting values
within the news industry, courts must not depart from their vital
role in the American democratic system. More and more, however,
judges presiding over cases where the public's interest is greatest
are closing their courtroom doors. The reasons which led the
Supreme Court to recognize a First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings, therefore, would be equally served today by
recognition of a right of access to jurors' identities. While
countervailing interests may, in some cases, justify denial of access
to such information, specific findings should demonstrate (1) a
substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will
otherwise be prejudiced and (2) that reasonable alternatives to
closure cannot adequately protect the accused's Due Process rights.
137. Proceedings in Memory of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. ix, xv
(1942) (Address of the Honorable Learned Hand, Circuit Judge).
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